一帶一路 觀點

6月6日

zerohedge 觀點

One Belt, One Road, And One Debt Hangover

• http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-06-05/one-belt-one-road-and-one-debt-hangover
• China uses debt not in the customary financial manner, but as a political tool to generate employment and maintain social stability. Likewise China uses loans and investment as a tool to advance its strategic interests. This may be good geopolitics in the short run, but it will be a disaster economically in the long run.
• Just as Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs) can’t repay debts to Chinese banks, China’s foreign partners will not be able to repay debts to China itself. These twin disasters-in-the-making may converge in such a way that China’s assets disappear or become illiquid at exactly the time they are most needed to bail-out its own banking system.
• China has launched four major overseas investment initiatives in the past ten years.
1. China Investment Corporation, or CIC, established in 2007. Sovereign wealth funds are a way for countries to invest their reserves in securities other than safe instruments such as U.S. Treasury notes. CIC today has assets of over $800 billion, spread among stocks, corporate bonds, hedge funds, private equity, commodities, and commercial real estate. Some of CIC’s investments are directly-owned enterprises, including gold mines in Zimbabwe.While these assets may outperform Treasury notes over time, they are also illiquid, and would tend to decline in value during a financial panic. This means that about 20%, of China’s reserves are unavailable for critical tasks such as bailing out the banking system or defending the currency.
2.  the New Development Bank, NDB, created by the BRICS in 2014.
3. the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, AIIB, created by China in 2016.These have participation from 35 countries in the Asia/Australia region, and 18 other countries from outside that region, mostly in Europe. The United States refused to join.
4.  the most ambitious outbound investment effort by China is the “One Belt, One Road” initiative.The “belt” refers to overland routes from central China to Europe. The “road” refers to maritime routes from eastern China to Southeast Asia, Africa, and Europe.
• The scope of the One Belt, One Road initiative is immense. It will include port facilities, railroads, highways, telecommunications channels, airports, transshipment facilities, renewable energy sources, and more strung out from Xian to Rotterdam, and from Guangzhou to Venice.
• China will turn liquid assets into illiquid assets in order to pursue its ambitions. This could make sense if nothing goes wrong. But, things will go wrong.
• China will face a monumental liquidity crisis sooner than later and find that its liquid assets have been turned into bridges to nowhere.

The Chinese Economic “Death Spiral”

• https://dailyreckoning.com/chinese-economic-death-spiral/
• China has reported annual growth rates since the panic of 2008 of between 6.7% and 12.2%, with a steady downward trend since early 2010. If China’s growth engine is running out of steam, as I’ve described, how has China managed to maintain such relatively high growth rates?
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• The answer is contained in three key words: debt, deflation and waste.
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• Waste is a blunt word referring to non-productive investment. The investment component of China’s GDP is about 45% of the total. Most major economies show about 25% to 35% for investment.
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• But at least half the Chinese investment is wasted. It goes to projects that will never produce an adequate return, either on an absolute basis or relative to alternative uses of the funds.
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• If this wasted investment is subtracted from GDP, similar to a one-time write off under general accounting principles, then 8% growth would be 6.2%, and 6% growth would be 4.7%. There are other distortions in Chinese growth figures, but wasted investment is one of the most glaring.
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• A simple example will make the point. During a recent visit to China I took the high-speed train from Beijing to Nanjing and passed through the magnificent new Nanjing South train station.
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• The train had the smoothest, quietest ride I’ve ever experienced even at speeds of 305 kph. The noisy clickity-clack of Amtrak’s Acela service from New York to Washington seems like a Wells Fargo stagecoach ride through the Old West compared to the Chinese railroad.
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• The train station was over a quarter-mile from one entrance to the other side, and had marble floors, high ceilings, expensive boutiques and over 128 escalators that all functioned perfectly.
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• There’s only one problem. My ticket cost about $30. Tickets on Amtrak for a ride of similar duration cost about $250, and Amtrak losses money.  There’s no way China can pay the costs of building and operating its railroad system with such inexpensive tickets.
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• But the Nanjing South train station project did create 20,000 construction jobs for over two years. That really is the point. China needs to find jobs for the millions of worker arriving from the countryside looking for work.
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• Failure to generate those jobs could result in social instability, riots, and attacks on the legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party of China. As a result, China borrows the equivalent of billions of dollars to finance white elephant and prestige projects that create jobs with little thought given to how the debt will be repaid.
• 
  
• How the Chinese Economy Grows
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• This brings us to the next element in China’s non-sustainable growth formula — debt. Any economy can produce short-term growth by incurring debt and using the proceeds as government spending, tax cuts, investment, or grants. This is nothing more than the classic Keynesian fiscal stimulus with its mystical “multiplier” effect that produces more than $1.00 in aggregate demand for every $1.00 borrowed and spent.
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• In fact, there’s ample evidence that the Keynesian multiplier only exists when an economy is in recession or the very early stages of an expansion, and when its debt levels are relatively low and sustainable. Highly indebted economies in the late stages of an expansion do not conform to Keynes’ theory of a multiplier.
• 
  
• Unfortunately for China, it is both highly indebted and has not suffered a recession for eight years. China should therefore expect the GDP multiplier on new debt used for spending or infrastructure to be less than 1.
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• That is exactly what the data shows. The chart below measures credit intensity defined as the number of units of local currency needed to produce one unit of growth. The local currency metric is a measured by central bank money printing to monetize debt, and is therefore a proxy for the debt itself.
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• The chart shows that in China today, it takes $4.00 of money printing to produce $1.00 of growth. This is up significantly from 2008 when it took $1.70 of money printing to produce $1.00 of growth. This shows that the Keynesian multiplier is less than 1, in fact it’s 0.25 in China today. (Only Europe shows a true multiplier where less than one unit of new money can produce a unit of growth).
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• The chart also shows that China’s situation is growing worse. It takes more and more debt to produce less and less growth. This is a non-sustainable dynamic that can only end in a debt crisis, a recession, or both.
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• China is now trapped in a debt death spiral. It cannot afford for growth to slow because that would cause unemployment, bankruptcies, and social unrest. But, it cannot continue growing without massive borrowing and spending programs.
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• China is Ground Zero for Deflation
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• This debt problem points to the third element in China’s growth formula, which is deflation. Persistent deflation and disinflation is caused globally by a combination of demographics, debt, deleveraging, and technology.
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• China is ground zero for global deflation because of its cost structure and its cheap currency that exports deflation to trading partners.
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• Real growth is calculated as nominal growth minus inflation. A simple example would be an economy with 5% nominal growth and 2% inflation. The real growth would be 3%, (5 – 2 = 3).
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• Deflation is really “negative inflation.” In converting from nominal to real growth, you are subtracting a negative, which is like adding. For example, an economy with 1% nominal growth and 2% deflation, would have 3% real growth, (1 – (-2) = 3).
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• This “growth through deflation” dynamic has been playing out in China is recent years. This can produce higher real growth, but it does so with lower nominal growth.
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• The problem is that debt repayments are nominal. While real growth can be strong in a deflationary period (like in the U.S. in the 1870s), the lack of nominal growth makes it harder to pay off nominal debt. Deflation makes the real value of debt go up, which compounds an already dangerous debt situation.
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• On the earlier visit to Nanjing, I met with provincial Communist Party officials who took me on a tour of a massive multi-city construction project with office parks, skyscrapers, apartment buildings, hotels, recreational facilities and transportation links for each of the cities. It was all empty.
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• When we returned for tea in the provincial officials’ offices, I asked how they expected to repay the debt used to fund the construction. The head official answered matter-of-factly, “Oh, we can’t repay it. Beijing will have to bail us out.”
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• Similarly, a Bloomberg reporter recently interviewed a Chinese bank customer who had just purchased a Wealth Management Products (WMP) from her bank. The reporter asked the customer if she was worried about the credit quality of the loans backing-up her WMP. She replied, “No, not at all. If anything goes wrong, Beijing will bail us out.”
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• This blind faith in Beijing’s ability to bail out every bad debt in the world’s second largest economy raises the question of Beijing’s willingness and ability to do so.
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• Higher interest rates will ultimately bankrupt Chinese companies and lead to higher unemployment and slower growth. Look for the Chinese banking system to weaken.
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• In less than six months, the yuan could finally undergo a maxi-devaluation.

5月17日

台灣自由時報觀點

中國全力打造一帶一路？被爆其實投資逐年下降

http://m.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/2069865

中國新浪網觀點

日本想入亚投行.支持不支持？

https://news.sina.cn/gn/2017-05-17/detail-ifyfeius8016334.d.html?from=wap&HTTPS=1

5月16日

中國媒體觀點

一帶一路峰會　成果清單影響全球你我生活
http://kool88.com/article/201705/0110027

2017「一帶一路」國際合作高峰論壇形成270多項成果清單。這是一個很具體的數字，顯示這次會議相當成功，而且是深深影響了全球你我的生活。這次「一帶一路」峰會發佈「推進「一帶一路」貿易暢通合作倡議」，大陸將從2018年起舉辦中國國際進口博覽會，讓各參與方都能更容易進入大陸市場、享受大陸發展紅利。

「一帶一路」倡議來自中國，但成效惠及世界。從貿易暢通到民心相通，需要看得見、摸得著的商品作為載體。例如當中國人能方便快捷地買到伊朗的藏紅花，中歐班列拉著蘇格蘭威士忌回程的時候，無論是生産商還是消費者，在商品價值鏈上的每一個參與方，都能切切實實地體會到「一帶一路」帶來的便利與實惠。

推動「一帶一路」倡議，將加深中國大陸與相關國家的經濟往來，這一過程與中國大陸經濟再平衡密切相關。大陸商務部的數據顯示，2014年到2016年，中國大陸與「一帶一路」沿線國家（地區）貿易總額超3兆美元，預計未來5年，中國大陸將從沿線國家和地區進口2兆美元的商品。這些進口的商品不但將推動中國大陸經濟的發展，也會豐富居民的消費選擇。從這個角度看，「一帶一路」的進口博覽會上展示的內容能惠及每一個人。

在這次「一帶一路」國際合作高峰論壇期間及前期，中國大陸與很多國家和國際組織，簽署一批「一帶一路」建設的合作文件和多項合作協議。其中之一就是發佈「推進「一帶一路」貿易暢通合作倡議」。
根據此倡議，中國將從2018年起舉辦中國國際進口博覽會。從目前的情況看，預計明年會有90個以上國家參加進口博覽會，這將進一步提升「一帶一路」倡議的影響力，也將進一步增強中國大陸對外開放、推動全球貿易增長的戰略主動權。這是來自大陸財經專家的分析觀點。

中國過去舉辦的類似博覽會主要以出口為主，例如廣交會，現在要舉辦進口博覽會，這樣的轉變背後折射出中國大陸的哪些變化？中國舉辦國際進口博覽會可以為老百姓釋放哪些實實在在的紅利呢？
從將欲取之，必先予之。這句話是蘊含了中國的古老智慧。從這次一帶一路峰會上，中國大陸舉辦國際進口博覽會就是對國際社會做貢獻的方式。同時舉辦進口博覽會是創新之舉
以國際貿易為導向的博覽會，對人們來說並不陌生，例如耳熟能詳的廣交會就屬這一類型。
中國進出口商品交易會，又稱廣交會，創辦於1957年春，是中國目前歷史最長、規模最大、商品種類最全、到會採購商最多且分佈國別地區最廣的綜合性國際貿易盛會。廣交會歷經60年，以出口為主，累計出口成交約12335億美元。
從2007年4月第101屆起，廣交會由中國出口商品交易會更名為中國進出口商品交易會，由單一齣口平台變為進出口雙向交易平臺，但仍以出口為主。
與廣交會等以前中國大陸舉辦的類似為了帶動出口的展會相比，現在舉辦專門的進口博覽會則是創新之舉。
「一帶一路」並非中國大陸的獨角戲，而是相關國家共同的大合唱，進口博覽會是一種讓各參與方都能更容易進入中國大陸市場、享受中國大陸發展紅利、實現互利共贏的途徑。
大陸資深財經媒體人分析，進口博覽會不僅會是以貿易暢通為目標的「一帶一路」建設成果，背後折射的更是中國的國際責任和擔當，以及中國經濟面臨的深刻轉變。
近年來全球貿易增速低於經濟增速，不少國家發展前景不確定性增強。「一帶一路」倡議則正是擺脫經濟增長乏力、貿易量停滯的解決方案。
從深化國際貿易往來看，「一帶一路」倡議會為相關國家帶來實際的效益。進口博覽會是中國大陸對全球經濟復甦作出貢獻的方式，也是為推動全球貿易增長搭建的國際化平台。


華爾街日報觀點

中國“一帶一路”貿易聲明遭歐洲抵制
http://cn.wsj.com/big5/20170516/bch101107.asp

參與“一帶一路”高峰論壇的外交官員稱，在為期兩天的會議上，中國提議的大部分內容贏得了支持，但未能爭取到歐洲國家在一份貿易聲明上簽字。

在北京舉行的“一帶一路”高峰論壇上，中國努力動員數十個國家和數十億美元資金支持這個宏大的基礎設施建設計劃，但歐洲提出了一些不同意見，凸現出就中國國家主席習近平的全球化藍圖達成共識所面臨的困難。

外交官員稱，在為期兩天的會議上，中國提議的大部分內容贏得了支持，但未能爭取到歐洲國家在一份貿易聲明上簽字。

出席此次論壇的歐洲官員表示，中國提議的貿易聲明沒有包含有關透明度和合約招標標準等方面的內容，儘管中國在此前舉行的二十國集團(G20)峰會和亞歐峰會上讚同類似的公正治理措辭。

一位歐洲官員稱，歐洲方面認為這份聲明措辭與中國之前所認同的觀點相比是一種倒退。該官員認為﹐中國政府起草這份聲明旨在使中國企業在未來的絲路合同中受益，主要是為了銷售中國的商品。

中國外交部和商務部均未回應置評請求。該貿易聲明未在週一論壇閉幕時發布。

法國駐北京大使館發表了一份聲明﹐詳述了歐盟在此次論壇上的立場。這份聲明表示﹐有關所有利益相關方的計劃和活動的透明度、以及開放的、基於規則的公開招標和互惠的市場準入必須成為合作的基礎。

在布魯塞爾﹐歐盟貿易事務發言人Daniel Rosario表示﹐歐盟不能支持中國提議的貿易聲明﹐因為該聲明無法確認歐盟和中國在國際貿易規則和為所有企業營造公平競爭環境方面的共同承諾。他表示﹐中國政府是在此次論壇臨近尾聲時提出該聲明的﹐擬定該聲明的流程無法產生包容性的解決方案。

出席本次論壇的美國國家安全委員會(National Security Council)主任週日發表了一篇簡短講話，對歐洲關注公平採購程序表示認同，稱確保競標過程透明有利於“一帶一路”項目。目前還不清楚美國代表團是否參與了貿易聲明的討論。

在歐洲官員反對貿易聲明措辭後，中國給出一份國家名單，稱這些國家支持貿易聲明中的措辭，其中包括葡萄牙。但歐洲官員表示，葡萄牙官員告訴他們，葡萄牙不支持這些措辭，也沒有被徵求意見。

歐洲官員稱，中國政府似乎是想在個別歐盟成員國與歐盟之間製造對立。

葡萄牙駐華大使佩雷拉(Jorge Torres-Pereira)通過電子郵件向《華爾街日報》(The Wall Street Journal)表示，中國偏愛的貿易措辭製造了一些障礙，讓歐盟成員國難以為其背書。他沒有就此詳述。

歐洲官員稱，中國擬定的這份貿易聲明是突然送交各國代表團的，事先幾乎不曾征詢意見。這些官員還稱，此次論壇最終發佈的公報則不同，這份公報幾週來經過多次修改，當中使用的貿易措辭為各方所認同。

在這份週一發佈的公報中，習近平和包括阿根廷、俄羅斯、埃塞俄比亞和菲律賓等29個國家的領導人共同表示，將致力於維護自由貿易，尊重各國主權和領土完整，反對一切形式的保護主義。

習近平週一對來訪的領導人表示，“一帶一路”是一個開放包容的合作平台，是各方共同打造的全球公共產品。

但是一些國家擔心，這個計劃的主要目的是促進中國的戰略利益，推動中國企業走向海外，而與此同時，中國卻限制外國企業進入其國內市場。

最終公佈的公報包含了習近平之前的許多講話內容，但沒有包括他將一帶一路計劃稱為全球公共產品的描述——這個詞在《華爾街日報》看到的一份較早草案中提到過。取而代之的是，該計劃被稱為一項“重要的國際倡議”。

中國官方媒體報道，來自近130個國家的約1500名代表參加了此次論壇。習近平稱，由於參與者熱情高漲，中國將於2019年舉辦第二屆一帶一路國際合作高峰論壇。

一些政府對于參與一帶一路計劃似乎持謹慎態度，而部分亞洲國家的公眾已經對中國投資表達了不滿情緒。

習近平週一表示，同中國簽署一帶一路合作協議的國家和國際組織總數達到68個。目前尚不清楚上述協議的約束力程度及承諾投入的資金數額。

台灣觀點

台灣冷眼看「一帶一路」，機會？風險？

http://www.storm.mg/article/266769

北京推動一帶一路的目的，確實是既有經濟面因素、也有國際政治面的考量。中國這3年多來的經濟走緩，國內經濟飽受「去產能」的壓力，一帶一路的經濟戰略其實就是要透過貸款（亞投行與相關基金提供），支持一帶一路上的開發中國家推動基礎建設，讓中國過剩的產能有出口之路；在這些國家因提升基礎建設、帶動經濟成長、增加國民所得後，又會增加對其它商品與服務的需求，中國又可從中得到後續出口的利益。而在深化加強與各國的經濟關係之後，必然也延伸中國的國際政治影響力。這個計劃因而被稱為「中國版的馬歇爾計劃」─雖然中國官方與媒體都拒絕這種比喻。

對一帶一路效益的懷疑，主要是擔心中國是否輸出其「無效益」及加深經濟不平衡。一帶一路上的新興經濟體中，有不少國家的政府治理不上軌道，驟然得到國際上的龐大貸款，即使是指定項目的基礎建設貸款，也容易存在著浪費、執行無效率、甚至貪污等情況─類似案例，其實在過去由亞銀、世銀等國際機構所主導、對開發中國家的貸款中，其實是屢見不鮮了。

此外，雖然敲鑼打鼓高唱上雲霄，但數據卻顯示，中國對一帶一路國家的直接投資金額，卻在去年下降2%，今年首季甚至減少18%；中國三大國有非商業性「政策性銀行」中的主力：中國國家開發銀行，對「一帶一路」國家的貸款餘額是不增反減的下降10億美元，看起來一帶一路在商機與吸引力上，其實遠不如官方所稱的火熱。

這些講法都有道理，不過，看待一帶一路的機會與風險，應該從短期與長期，還有不同的立足點來觀照。

短期而言，亞投行去年已正式成立，這個千億美元資本額的機構一定要有績效，對一帶一路國家基礎建設的計劃貸款，陸續會走完程序並落實執行，加上在峰會上，習近平已宣布加碼4000億人民幣支持一帶一路；短期的投資減少，不必太過憂心。未來的商機與經濟效益必然存在，且會逐漸加溫。

但長期而言，如果計劃執行不夠嚴謹、接受貸款國的政府治理有問題等因素，則可能讓其產生的經濟效益降低，期盼中帶動整個區域經濟增長的目標未必能達成，也就是說後續的經濟效益未能產生，則會對貸款單位與中國經濟帶來風險。

不過，對大部份覬覦一帶一路商機的國家與企業而言，重點是只要能參與計劃、拿到工程與採購案，就是獲利的贏家；至於未來主要的風險，其實是由主辦國與貸款機構─當然還有中國─擔當。因此對其它國家與一般企業而言，理性的算計就是儘量加入獲取其中的商機，除非倒楣到工程作完卻碰上「倒帳」，否則就算蓋的都是「蚊子基建設施」，只要款項拿得到，風險其實是低得很；這是一種「機會是自己的，風險是別人的」局面。

只是對台灣而言，情況正好相反─「機會是別人的，風險是自己的」。因為兩岸關係僵局因素，台灣既無法加入亞投行，也不可能參與一帶一路商機；縱然對岸官方釋出「歡迎台商參與一帶一路」的訊息，但口惠而實不至，大概只有少數台商能分享商機，且頂多分食「小肉渣」，因此，對台灣經濟而言，一帶一路難謂是一個「機會」，反倒可能是一個難以掌握的風險。

短期而言，是一帶一路的經濟效益與商機，台灣幾乎無法分享；長期而言是，如果一帶一路成功整合這些區域內的經濟體，形成一個「準區域經貿組織」， 被排除在外的台灣，其經貿邊緣化的壓力與影響將更大─特別是美國退出TPP，選擇從自由貿易中退卻，中國主導的RCEP、一帶一路等則持續推進，台灣卻在圈外，未來經濟的風險會增高。國內從政府到社會可以冷眼看一帶一路，因為那是別人家的嘉年華會，但不能對未來的風險視若無睹。


個別觀點

新聞眼／19大前 「一帶一路」鞏固習政權
https://udn.com/news/story/11125/2465548

• 中國國務院發展研究中心世界發展研究所研究員丁一凡
• 中國總有一些輿論質疑「一帶一路」，認為這是一項好大喜功的工程，終會落得費力不討好的結果。
• 但他樂觀地認為，如果一帶一路重建成功，包括阿富汗在內的諸多戰亂國家將有和平的希望。
• 香港的中國經濟學者張煒
• 對習近平個人而言，將他描繪成一個具有全球眼光和國際領導力的領袖，目的是在19大之前鞏固習近平的政治權威。
• 國際會計審計專業服務機構普華永道
• 如果一帶一路倡議全面鋪開，整個實施的過程將是長期的，時間跨越至少30到40年。幾十年太遠，兩年卻在眼前。在本次的高峰論壇上，習近平宣布中國將在2019年舉辦第二屆「一帶一路」國際高峰論壇。屆時參加國家數量的多少、官員級別的高低，都可以看成是判斷中國「一帶一路」倡議是否成功的參考