Triffin Dilemma 特裡芬悖論/ 特裡芬難題, Jamaica Accords 牙買加體系, 超主權貨幣

超主權貨幣

http://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/%E8%B6%85%E4%B8%BB%E6%9D%83%E8%B4%A7%E5%B8%81

牙買加體系

概況

1960年，美國經濟學家羅伯特·特里芬(Robert Triffin)在其《黃金與美元危機——自由兌換的未來》一書中提出的布雷頓森林體系存在著其自身無法克服的內在矛盾：「由於美元與黃金掛鉤，而其他國家的貨幣與美元掛鉤，美元雖然因此而取得了國際核心貨幣的地位，但是各國為了發展國際貿易，必須用美元作為結算與儲備貨幣，這樣就會導致流出美國的貨幣在海外不斷沉澱，對美國來說就會發生長期貿易逆差；而美元作為國際貨幣核心的前提是必須保持美元幣值穩定與堅挺，這又要求美國必須是一個長期貿易順差國。這兩個要求互相矛盾，因此是一個悖論。」 這一內在矛盾在國際經濟學界稱為「特里芬難題(Triffin Dilemma)」正是這個「難題」決定了布雷頓森林體系的不穩定性和垮台的必然性。

根據「特里芬難題」所闡述的原因，美國以外的國家持有的美元越多，由於「信心」問題，這些國家就越不願意持有美元，就會拋售美元。從1971年美國政府宣布美元與黃金固定價格脫鉤的「尼克松震蕩」開始。布雷頓森林體系就開始瓦解。直到21世紀初國際貨幣體系的改革也沒有解決好「特里芬難題」。

歷史

二戰結束時，美國不僅是軍事上的戰勝國，而且在經濟上也以勝利者的姿態嶄露頭角。當時它擁有250多億美元的黃金儲備，約佔世界總量的75％，成為國際上實力最雄厚的經濟大國。這樣，財大氣粗的美國就「挾黃金以令諸侯」，建立一個體現自己意志的貨幣合作協定———布雷頓森林體系。其核心內容之一就是美國以黃金儲備為保證，向世界各國提供美元，由美元來充當惟一的國際貨幣。美國政府承諾「美元和黃金一樣可靠」，各國可以按照1盎司黃金等於35美元的官方價格，隨時用美元向美國兌換黃金。
在布雷頓森林體系中，美國承擔著兩個基本的職責，一是要保證美元按固定官價兌換黃金，以維持各國對美元的信心；二是要為國際貿易的發展提供足夠的國際清償力，即美元。然而這兩個問題，信心和清償力卻是有矛盾的，美元過少會導致清償力不足，美元過多則會出現信心危機。原因在於，美國要持續不斷地向其他國家提供美元，只能讓自己的國際收支始終保持赤字，由此留下的「大窟窿」，惟一的填補辦法就是開動印鈔機，印刷美元現鈔，結果是美元越來越多；然而另一方面，收支赤字卻意味著美國的黃金儲備不僅不能增加，反而會由於別國的兌換而減少。這樣，一邊是美元越來越多，一邊是黃金越來越少，美元兌換黃金失去保證，美元出現信心危機。

歷史事件

事實不幸被特里芬言中。在二戰結束后的最初幾年裡，歐亞各國百廢待興，需要從美國進口商品，但由於缺少美元，所以形成了「美元荒」。在50年代中期之前，美元基本上還是比較緊缺，各國仍然願意積累美元，沒有出現美元的信心問題。1958年以後，「美元荒」變成了「美元災」，美國持續的收支赤字引起了許多國家的不滿。其中尤以法國總統戴高樂的言辭最為激烈，他認為，美元享有「過分的特權」，它的國際收支赤字實際上無需糾正，可以用印製美鈔的方式來彌補；而其他國家，一旦發生了赤字，只能採取調整措施，蒙受失業和經濟增長下降的痛苦，只能省吃儉用地節省外匯。

對於這些不滿情緒，美國始終置若罔聞，不願意為此付出調整國內經濟的代價，來減少國際收支的赤字，依然對發行美鈔樂此不疲。其原因在於，美元可以用於國際支付，因此，只要印鈔機一轉，不但能夠輕而易舉地抹平赤字，而且其他國家的商品和勞務也可以滾滾而來。

50年代末期，美國的黃金儲備大量外流，對外短期債務激增。到1960年，美國的短期債務已經超過其黃金儲備，美元的信用基礎發生了動搖。當年10月，爆發了戰後第一次大規模拋售美元、搶購黃金的美元危機。美國政府請求其他國家予以合作，共同穩定金融市場。各國雖然與美國有利害衝突和意見分歧，但美元危機直接影響國際貨幣制度，也關係到各自的切身利益，因而各國採取了協調衝突、緩解壓力的態度，通過一系列國際合作，來穩定美元。除合作性措施之外，美國還運用政治壓力，勸說外國政府，不要拿美元向美國財政部兌換黃金，並曾就此與當時的聯邦德國政府達成協議。

20世紀60年代中期，越戰爆發，美國的國際收支進一步惡化，到1968年3月，其黃金儲備已降至120億美元，只夠償付短期債務的三分之一。結果在倫敦、巴黎和蘇黎士黃金市場上，爆發了空前規模的美元危機，在半個月內美國的黃金儲備又流失了14億美元，巴黎市場金價一度漲至44美元1盎司。於是美國政府被迫要求英國關閉倫敦黃金市場，宣布實行「黃金雙價制」，即各國中央銀行之間的官方市場，仍維持35美元1盎司的官價，私人黃金市場的價格，則完全由供求關係自行決定。到1971年夏天，美國黃金儲備已不足100億美元，美元貶值的形勢越來越明顯，由此引發了一場資金外逃的狂潮，並於當年夏天達到了頂點。面對著各國要求兌換黃金的巨大壓力，1971年8月15日，尼克松總統被迫宣布實施「新經濟政策」，切斷美元和黃金的聯繫。其他國家所擁有的700多億美元，到底還值多少黃金，美國政府
從此再也沒有作出回答。

美元不再和黃金掛鉤，宣告了布雷頓森林體系的崩潰。歷史終於以這樣一種代價慘重的方式，破解了特里芬難題。

問題說明

作為建立在黃金一美元本位基礎上的布雷頓森林體系的根本缺陷在於，美元既是一國貨幣，又是世界貨幣。作為一國貨幣，它的發行必須受制於美國的貨幣政策和黃金儲備；作為世界貨幣，美元的供給又必須適應於國際貿易和世界經濟增長的需要。由於黃金產量和美國黃金儲備量增長跟不上世界經濟發展的需要，在「雙掛鉤」原則下，美元便出現了一種進退兩難的境地：為滿足世界經濟增長對國際支付手段和儲備貨幣的增長需要，美元的供應應當不斷地增長；而美元供給的不斷增長，又會導致美元同黃金的兌換性日益難以維持。美元的這種兩難，即「特里芬難題」指出了布雷頓森林體系的內在不穩定性及危機發生的必然性，該貨幣體系的根本缺陷在於美元的雙重身份和雙掛鉤原則，由此導致的體系危機是美元的可兌換的危機，或人們對美元可兌換的信心危機。正是由於上述問題和缺陷，導致該貨幣體系基礎的不穩定性，當著該貨幣體系的重要支柱——美元出現危機時，必然帶來這一貨幣體系危機的相應出現。

任何理論命題的成立都應以其對現實生活的洞察及對寓於其中的內在矛盾的揭示為前提。特里芬難題所直接針對的，正是寓於布雷頓森林體制之中的矛盾。早在布雷頓森林體制尚處於正常運行的5O年代後期，特里芬就開始對該體制的生命力表示懷疑，結果，便是「特里芬難題」的提出。特里芬總結道：與黃金掛鉤的布雷頓森林體制下美元的國際供給，是通過美國國際收支逆差、即儲備的凈流出來實現的。這會產生兩種相互矛盾的可能：如果美國糾正它的國際收支逆差，則美元穩定金價穩定，然而美元的國際供給不衍需求；結果美國聽任它的國際收支逆差，則美元的國際供給雖不成問題，但由此積累的海外美元資產勢必遠遠超過其黃金兌換能力，從而美元的兌換性難於維繫。如此兩難困境，註定了布雷頓森林體制的崩潰只是時間早遲而已。

理論評價

實踐已經證明特里芬難題的正確性。在評價特里芬難題的理論意義的時候注意以下幾點：

第一，特里芬難題的實質在於，指出了現代國際經濟生活中黃金與信用貨幣之間不可調合的衝突所達到的尖銳程度。自金本位制以來的人類商品經濟史，無論是在一國之內、還是國際範圍內都程度不同地反映出黃金與信用貨幣之間矛盾鬥爭的軌跡，而特里芬所揭示的布雷頓森林體制的兩難困境無非是在典型環境下的插曲罷了。

第二，特里芬難題所直接針對的，雖然只是布雷頓森林體制，但由於上述理由，它的理論內涵所能包容的歷史事實，卻遠遠不止於布雷頓森林體制，它實際上也是對戰前金匯兌本位制(包括黃金——英鎊本位制)的歷史反思。

第三，在國際貨幣制度伺題上，特里芬是一個「凱恩斯主義者」。凱恩斯在理論上反對金本位制，在實踐上，40年代初，他提出的「凱恩斯計劃」不僅反對與黃金掛鉤的國際貨幣制度，而且曾明確建議設立不兌現黃金的國際貨幣單位班柯爾(Bancor)。而特里芬在對布雷頓森林體制提出質疑時。主要的疑點也集中在黃金與美元的關係上，他主張黃金的非貨幣化，並且明確建議特別提款權成為主要的國際儲備手段，以逐步替換黃金和美元儲備。可見，特里芬難題實則是在凱恩斯的國際貨幣管理理論的基礎上發展起來的，其新穎之處不在於理論基礎的創新，而在於他應用這一理論對布雷頓森林體制所進行的獨到剖析。尤其可貴的是，在多數人都對布雷頓森林體制頗多讚譽。同時該體制還處於良好運轉的50年代。特里芬能獨闢蹊徑、切中要害。

意義

「特里芬難題」告誡人們：依靠主權國家貨幣來充當國際清償能力的貨幣體系必然會陷人「特里芬難題」而走向崩潰。不論這種貨幣能否兌換黃金，不論是哪一國貨幣，不論是一國貨幣還是幾國貨幣，也不論是以一國貨幣為主還是平均的幾國貨幣，其實質道理是一樣的，因而其結果也會一樣。「特里芬難題」揭示的意義正在於此。這對於我們分析未來國際貨幣體系的發展無疑有著重要的啟示作用。


參考:
http://www.twword.com/wiki/%E7%89%B9%E9%87%8C%E8%8A%AC%E9%9B%A3%E9%A1%8C#1

• 了解Triffin Dilemma
• https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/center/mm/eng/mm_sc_03.htm
• http://wiki.mbalib.com/zh-tw/%E7%89%B9%E9%87%8C%E8%8A%AC%E9%9A%BE%E9%A2%98

牙買加體系

牙買加體系簡介

佈雷頓森林體系崩潰以後，國際金融秩序又復動蕩，國際社會及各方人士也紛紛探析能否建立一種新的國際金融體系，提出了許多改革主張，如恢復金本位，恢復美元本位制，實行綜合貨幣本位制及設立最適貨幣區等，但均未能取得實質性進展。國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)於1972年7月成立一個專門委員會，具體研究國際貨幣制度的改革問題，由11個主要工業國家和9個發展中國家共同組成。委員會於 1974的6月提出一份“國際貨幣體系改革綱要”，對黃金、匯率、儲備資產、國際收支調節等問題提出了一些原則性的建議，為以後的貨幣改革奠定了基礎。直至1976年1月，國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)理事會“國際貨幣制度臨時委員會”在牙買加首都金斯敦舉行會議,討論國際貨幣基金協定的條款，經過激烈的爭論，簽定達成了“牙買加協議”，同年4月，國際貨幣基金組織理事會通過了《IMF協定第二修正案》，從而形成了新的國際貨幣體系。

牙買加協議的主要內容

1、實行浮動匯率制度的改革。
　　牙買加協議正式確認了浮動匯率制的合法化，承認固定匯率制與浮動匯率制並存的局面，成員國可自由選擇匯率制度。同時IMF繼續對各國貨幣匯率政策實行嚴格監督，並協調成員國的經濟政策，促進金融穩定，縮小匯率波動範圍。
2、推行黃金非貨幣化。
　　協議作出了逐步使黃金退出國際貸幣的決定。並規定：廢除黃金條款，取消黃金官價，成員國中央銀行可按市價自由進行黃金交易；取消成員國相互之間以及成員國與IMF之間須用黃金清算債權債務的規定，IMF逐步處理其持有的黃金。
3、增強特別提款權的作用。
　　主要是提高特別提款權的國際儲備地位，擴大其在IMF一般業務中的使用範圍，並適時修訂特別提款權的有關條款。
4、增加成員國基金份額。
　　成員國的基金份額從原來的292億特別提款權增加至390億特別提款權，增幅達33，6％。
5、擴大信貸額度，以增加對發展中國家的融資。

牙買加體系的運行

1、儲備貨幣多元化。

　　與佈雷頓森林體系下國際儲備結構單一、美元地位十分突出的情形相比，在牙買加體系下，國際儲備呈現多元化局面，美元雖然仍是主導的國際貨幣，但美元地位明顯削弱了，由美元壟斷外匯儲備的情形不復存在。西德馬克(現德國馬克)、日元隨兩國經濟的恢複發展脫穎而出，成為重要的國際儲備貨幣。目前，國際儲備貨幣已日趨多元化，ECU也被歐元所取代，歐元很可能成為與美元相抗衡的新的國際儲備貨幣。

2、匯率安排多樣化。

　　在牙買加體系下，浮動匯率制與固定匯率制並存。一般而言，發達工業國家多數採取單獨浮動或聯合浮動，但有的也採取釘住自選的貨幣籃子。對發展中國家而言，多數是釘住某種國際貨幣或貨幣籃子，單獨浮動的很少。不同匯率制度各有優劣，浮動匯率制度可以為國內經濟政策提供更大的活動空間與獨立性，而固定匯率制則減少了本國企業可能面臨的匯率風險，方便生產與核算。各國可根據自身的經濟實力、開放程度、經濟結構等一系列相關因素去權衡得失利弊。

3、多種渠道調節國際收支。

　　主要包括：

　　(1)運用國內經濟政策。

　　國際收支作為一國巨集觀經濟的有機組成部分，必然受到其他因素的影響。一國往往運用國內經濟政策，改變國內的需求與供給，從而消除國際收支不平衡。比如在資本項目逆差的情況下，可提高利率，減少貨幣發行，以此吸引外資流入，彌補缺口。需要註意的是：運用財政或貨幣政策調節外部均衡時，往往會受到“米德衝突”的限制，在實現國際收支平衡的同時，犧牲了其他的政策目標，如經濟增長、財政平衡等，因而內部政策應與匯率政策相協調，才不至於顧此失彼。

　　(2)運用匯率政策。

　　在浮動匯率制或可調整的釘住匯率制下，匯率是調節國際收支的一個重要工具，其原理是：經常項目赤字本幣趨於下跌本幣下跌、外貿競爭力增加出口增加、進口減少經濟項目赤字減少或消失。相反，在經常項目順差時，本幣幣值上升會削弱進出口商品的競爭力，從而減少經常項目的順差。實際經濟運行中，匯率的調節作用受到“馬歇爾一勒納條件”以及“J曲線效應”的制約，其功能往往令人失望。

　　(3)國際融資。

　　在佈雷頓森林體系下，這一功能主要由IMF完成。在牙買加體系下，IMF的貸款能力有所提高，更重要的是，伴隨石油危機的爆發和歐洲貨幣市場的迅猛發展，各國逐漸轉向歐洲貨幣市場，利用該市場比較優惠的貸款條件融通資金，調節國際收支中的順逆差。

　　(4)加強國際協調。

　　這主要體現在：①以IMF為橋梁，各國政府通過磋商，就國際金融問題達成共識與諒解，共同維護國際金融形勢的穩定與繁榮。②新興的七國首腦會議的作用。西方七國通過多次會議，達成共識，多次合力干預國際金融市場，主觀上是為了各自的利益，但客觀上也促進了國際金融與經濟的穩定與發展。

牙買加體系的主要特徵

• 浮動匯率制度的廣泛實行，這使各國政府有瞭解決國際收支不平衡的重要手段，即匯率變動手段；
• 各國採取不同的浮動形式，歐共體實質上是聯合浮動，日元是單獨浮動，還有眾多的國家是盯住浮動，這使國際貨幣體系變得複雜而難以控制；
• 各國央行對匯率實行干預制度；
• 特別提款權作為國際儲備資歷產和記帳單位的作用大大加強；
• 美元仍然是重要的國際儲備資產，而黃金作為儲備資產的作用大大削減，各國貨幣價值也基本上與黃金脫鉤。

對牙買加體系的評價

1、牙買加體系的積極作用：

　　(1)多元化的儲備結構擺脫了佈雷頓森林體系下各國貨幣間的僵硬關係，為國際經濟提供了多種清償貨幣，在較大程度上解決了儲備貨幣供不應求的矛盾；

　　(2)多樣化的匯率安排適應了多樣化的、不同發展水平的各國經濟，為各國維持經濟發展與穩定提供了靈活性與獨立性，同時有助於保持國內經濟政策的連續性與穩定性；

　　(3)多種渠道並行，使國際收支的調節更為有效與及時。

2、牙買加體系的缺陷：

　　(1)在多元化國際儲備格局下，儲備貨幣發行國仍享有“鑄幣稅”等多種好處，同時，在多元化國際儲備下，缺乏統一的穩定的貨幣標準，這本身就可能造成國際金融的不穩定；

　　(2)匯率大起大落，變動不定，匯率體系極不穩定。其消極影響之一是增大了外匯風險，從而在一定程度上抑制了國際貿易與國際投資活動，對發展中國家而言，這種負面影響尤為突出；

　　(3)國際收支調節機制並不健全，各種現有的渠道都有各自的局限，牙買加體系並沒有消除全球性的國際收支失衡問題。

　　如果說在佈雷頓森林體系下，國際金融危機是偶然的、局部的，那麼，在牙買加體系下，國際金融危機就成為經常的、全面的和影響深遠的。1973年浮動匯率普遍實行後，西方外匯市場貨幣匯價的波動、金價的起伏經常發生，小危機不斷，大危機時有發生。1978年10月，美元對其它主要西方貨幣匯價跌至歷史最低點，引起整個西方貨幣金融市場的動蕩。這就是著名的1977年—1978年西方貨幣危機。由於金本位與金匯兌本位制的瓦解，信用貨幣無論在種類上、金額上都大大增加。信用貨幣占西方各通貨流通量的90%以上，各種形式的支票、支付憑證、信用卡等到種類繁多，現金在某些國家的通貨中只占百分之幾。貨幣供應量和存放款的增長大大高於工業生產增長速度，而且國民經濟的發展對信用的依賴越來越深。總之，現有的國際貨幣體系被人們普遍認為是一種過渡性的不健全的體系，需要進行徹底的改革。


了解牙買加體系

• http://wiki.mbalib.com/zh-tw/%E7%89%99%E4%B9%B0%E5%8A%A0%E4%BD%93%E7%B3%BB
• http://www.iwiki.hk/wiki/%E7%89%99%E8%B2%B7%E5%8A%A0%E8%B2%A8%E5%B9%A3%E9%AB%94%E7%B3%BB#.WTZhr-uGPIU

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• 
  
• 方案: 
• 由民間參與 建立/改變 類似SDR特別提款權的國際貨幣，而並非單一由國與國之間組織建立。暫稱Democratic Monetary Fund
• 設置移情支援提款權制度 Empathy Support Drawing Right (ESDR)
• 
  
• 內容:
• 貨幣產生基礎為 以提供並完成既定的民間支援任務或落後國家支援任務為目標，每個民間支援任務都有一定代表一定抵債價值。
• 可以預先完成支援任務而獲得ESDR貨幣
• 各國國家債項可與DMS交換ESDR相抵消
• ESDR必須為正數。
• 好處:
• 打破Triffin Dilemma:  ESDR作為償還國際還款能力的國際貨幣不再受一國或個別國家之本國經濟狀況影響。
• 維持世界勢力平衡

新聞

24 May 2017

• Hadas: The next financial crisis could be in forex
• http://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-currency-breakingviews-idUSKBN18K25

18 May 2017

• SDRs: The 'World Money' Plan
• https://www.bullionvault.com/gold-news/imf-sdr-051820172
• What the IMF is discussing for Special Drawing Rights...
• LESS THAN a month ago a handful of the world's policy makers gathered in Washington at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), writes Craig Wilson in Addison Wiggin's Daily Reckoning.
• No surprising headlines were run – but an obscure meeting and a discreet report launched exclusive signals for the next global economic crisis.
• The panel, which included five of the most elite global bankers, was held during the IMF's spring meetings to discuss the special drawing rights (SDR) 50th anniversary. On the surface the panel was a snoozefest, but reading beyond the jargon offers critical takeaways.
• The discussion revealed what global central banks are planning for a future crisis and how the IMF is orchestrating policy for financial bubbles, currency shocks and institutional failures.
• Why the urgency from the financial elites?
• In the April 2017 "Global Financial Stability Report", IMF researchers targeted the US corporate debt market and how extreme changes in its equity market has left the global economy at risk. While the report may have been missed by major financial news outlets, it was enough to give major concern to those paying attention.
• The IMF research report noted:
• "The [US] corporate sector has tended to favor debt financing, with $7.8 trillion in debt and other liabilities added since 2010..."
• In another segment the IMF report said:
• "Corporate credit fundamentals have started to weaken, creating conditions that have historically preceded a credit cycle downturn. Asset quality – measured, for example, by the share of deals with weaker covenants – has deteriorated."
• "At the same time, a rising share of rating downgrades suggests rising credit risks in a number of industries, including energy and related firms in the context of oil price adjustments and also in capital goods and health care. Also consistent with this late stage in the credit cycle, corporate sector leverage has risen to elevated levels."
• This report together with the panel discussion highlights a very concerning trend. Jim Rickards, a currency wars expert and macroeconomic specialist, has identified the special drawing rights (SDR) as a class of "world money" that is a tool used to bailout central banks during crisis.
• World money was praised for its ability to be a catalyst for international loans during the IMF spring panel discussion.
• The panel discussion was moderated by Maurice Obstfeld, an established academic who serves as a Director of Research at the IMF. Obstfeld is connected, knows the right people, and can see the macroeconomic implications of SDRs.
• In his opening remarks Obstfeld identified, "There has been increasing debate over the role of the SDR since the global financial crisis. We in the Fund have been looking more intensively at the issue over whether an enhanced role for the SDR could improve the functioning of the international monetary system...
• "The official SDR is something we are familiar with but is there a role for the SDR in the market or a market SDR? What is the SDR's role for the unit of account?"
• Here's the five most important signals from the world money panel, what they could mean for the international monetary system and the future of the Dollar.
• 
  
• #1. China Spars for the SDR Market
• Yi Gang, the Deputy Governor of the People's Bank of China disclosed to the IMF panel that "China has started reporting our foreign official reserves, balance of payment reports, and the international investment position reports...
• "All of these reports, now, in China are published in US Dollars, SDR and Renminbi rates...I think that has the advantage of reducing the negative impact of negative liquidity on your assets."
• What that means in real terms is that China views the opportunity of being a part of the exclusive world money club as an opportunity to diversify away from the US Dollar.
• The Bank of China official took that message even further saying that he hopes that China could lead in world money operations by integrating it into the private sector.
• "If more and more people, companies and the market use SDR as unit of accounts – that would generate more activity in the market with focus on the MSDR. [The hope would be] that they could create more products and market infrastructures that would be available for trade products to be denominated in SDR."
• The People's Bank of China official referenced how this trend was already underway. Just last year Standard Chartered bank began to maintain accounts in SDR's. "In terms of the first and secondary markets they will develop fairly well."
• Perhaps the most important segment that the Chinese official signaled was his reference that "the Official Reserve SDR (OSDR) that allocation from the IMF is very important. [This allows] Central Banks to make the SDR an official asset, and easier for them to convert that asset into the reserve currency they need."
• What that means is that China will become an even greater player in the world money market.
• Nomi Prins, an economist and historian, stated when analyzing China's economic positioning, "The expanding SDR basket is as much a political power play as it is about increasing the number of reserve currencies for central banks for financial purposes."
• #2. Liquidity and Central Banks
• Jose Antonio Ocampo, one of the foremost scholars on international economics and a board member of the Central Bank of Colombia noted, "The main objective of SDR reform is actually...for it to be a major reserve asset for the international monetary system...
• "First of all, it is a truly global asset. It is backed by all of the members of the IMF and it doesn't have the problems that come with using a national currency as international currency. Second, it has a much better form of distribution of the creation of liquidity. Because it is shared by all members of the IMF...in that regard, it does serve as unconditional liquidity."
• That means that IMF and institutional economists view the SDR as a potential way of financing not only national government loans, but markets.
• The most fascinating point that Ocampo made about the SDR was about the position of conditional reserves and what it could mean for more SDR reform. Conditional reserves reference the ability of central banks to borrow and repay loans in a timely manner with conditionality.
• "Countries that hold excess SDR's should deposit them in the IMF. The IMF then could use those SDR's to finance its lending. [This will reduce] the need to have quotas, borrowing arrangements and methods to finance IMF programs. Like any decent central bank in the world they could use their own creation of liquidity as a sort of financing of that central bank."
• While the IMF has been a "central bank for central banks" this proposal would see the international monetary system shift entirely.
• Jim Rickards takes his analysis a step further showing that the liquidity and lending offer the IMF the ability to act during a crisis, as it did during the most recent global financial crisis.
• New York Times best-selling author Rickards reveals, "The 2009 issuance was a case of the IMF 'testing the plumbing' of the system to make sure it worked properly. With no issuance of SDRs for 28 years, from 1981-2009, the IMF wanted to rehearse the governance, computational and legal processes for issuing SDRs."
• "The purpose was partly to alleviate liquidity concerns at the time, but also partly to make sure the system works in case a large new issuance was needed on short notice."
• #3. Elites Signal Blueprint Plan
• Mohamed El-Erian a former Deputy Director of the IMF and the Chief Economic Adviser at Allianz (affiliated with Pimco) was the premier panelist to discuss the future blueprint plan of world money.
• El-Erian started out his discussion, "If the SDR is to play a really important role you cannot go through the official sector only today."
• He outlined the current political landscape for world money saying, "The politics today do not favor delegating economic governance from national to multilateral levels. Yet the case for the SDR is very strong."
• "It is not only about the Triffin Dilemma and [acting as] the official reserve, it's because if you ask anybody do you want to reduce the cost of self-insurance, they'll say yes. Do you want to facilitate diversification? They'll say yes. If you ask anybody, do you want to make liquidity less reciprocal, they'll say yes...
• "The SDR helps address every one of these issues. So, it solves problems not just at the official level but it solves problems in the private sector."
• To break that jargon down, Jim Rickards offers: "In other words, the latest plan is for the IMF to combine forces with mega-banks, and big investors like BlackRock and Pimco to implement the world money plan.
• "El-Erian is 'signaling' other global elites about the SDR plan so they can prepare accordingly."
• #4. The Death of the Dollar
• Catherine Schenk, a professor of International Economic History at the University of Glasgow, is one of the top scholars of economic relations. While speaking she took up the case of what the special drawing rights meant for the US Dollar.
• Dr.Schenk when asked whether the international market could proceed without a "lender of last resort" she pressed, "Why would you use a relatively illiquid element when you have the US Dollar...?
• "The US Dollar has a lot of problems, some of it is unstable but the depth and liquidity of it in financial markets are unrivaled. The history of trying to create bond markets for other currencies or other instruments shows that it takes a long time."
• She then elaborated later in the conversation the premise that, "What we are talking about with the market SDR is trying to turn it and add more facilities to turn it into money. That will take time. Having reluctant issuing, I am worried about how that market it going to be created."
• As the Dollar continues to have its issues what central banks like the Federal Reserve select to do matters significantly.
• As Christopher Whalen pens, "Whether you look at US stocks, residential housing markets or the Dollar, the picture that emerges is a market that has risen sharply, far more than the underlying rate of economic growth. This is due to a constraint in the supply of assets and a relative torrent of cash chasing the available opportunities."
• Whalen then asks the bigger question and one that could specifically matter for the SDR when he notes, "What happens when this latest Dollar super cycle ends?"
• How the competition for the top world reserve position unfolds between the SDR and US Dollar will be answered in time.
• #5. World Money Becomes Central Bank Money
• During the final Q&A for the panel on the SDR's, they were asked what the political climate looks like facing the issues of world money and the direction of political headwinds?
• In response Jose Antonio Ocampo said, "In the issue of liquidity, we still have a basic problem during a crisis – which is, how do you provide liquidity during crisis?"
• Ocampo, the Colombian central bank official disclosed, "My view is that it is a function for the SDR as central bank money, let's say."
• The SDR specialist took it further, "The real question is whether any of the major actors...and whether the US, either from the previous administration or the current administration, was willing [to politically act]?"
• He offered, "From the point of view of the US the use of SDR's as a market instrument should be more problematic than the reforms of the SDR to be used as central bank money."
• Under such circumstances the demand and confidence for the US Dollar as a global reserve would be diminished.
• Jim Rickards summarizes, "By the time the final loss of confidence arrives, much of the damage will already have been done. The analytic key is to look for those minor events pointing in the direction of lost confidence in the Dollar."
• "With that information investors can take defensive measures before it's too late."
• As was confirmed by both the IMF report and the elite panel on special drawing rights, the US Dollar is facing severe competition while undergoing a fiscal crisis.
• Rickards leaves a stark warning, "The US is playing into the hands of these rivals by running trade deficits, budget deficits and a huge external debt."